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It is a privilege to be invited to participate in the hearings of 
your Subconunittee and I am grateful for the honor. 
A great deal of information has already been contributed to this 
Subcommittee by highly-qualified persons on international investments 
and the multinational corporation. 
I shall for my part endeavour to highlight the connection existing 
between this modern form of industrial organization and the process of 
economic integration in Western Europe. Special problems do arise when 
multinational corporations are active in the European Community and in-
vestment flows into states which have agreed to become a single economic 
entity. 
My views are based on my experience as Member of the Commission of 
the European Communities; a position which I have held until a few weeks 
ago. They are based largely on the findings and the proposals outlined 
in a memorandum on the industrial policy of the European Community which 
was prepared under my responsibility and presented last spring by the 
Commission to the Council of Ministers. 
However, the opinions which I express here are my own. 
1). It is important that ideas and policies developed in Brussels 
should be appreciated in regard to the overall objective which we want 
to achieve in Europe. Members of the Subconunittee are no doubt aware of 
the purpose for which the process of European integration was launched 
twenty years ago. The aim was and still is that Europe acquire, through 
the gradual integration of the free and democratic nations of the conti-
nent, the strength required to bear its share of responsibility in the 
world. 
Consistent with this design, the productive structures of the member 
countries should take legitimate advantage of the creation of the Conununity 
in order to meet larger and larger doses of international competition over 
the wide world. 
Twenty years of effort have had positive results. A new reality, 
distinct from its national components, has come into existence. A customs 
union has been achieved; a network of common rules has been agreed upon 
and is being enforced. 
2). This new reality has been beneficial to us and to our trading 
partners in the world. 
Total trade between the Community and the United States today amounts 
to some $15 billion -- three times as much as in 1958. 
From 1958 to 1967, the United States had a large surplus -- averag-
ing $1.2 billion per annum -- on its trade account with the Community. 
In 1968, a very rapid expansion of domestic demand in the United 
States led to an exceptional growth of imports. But again in 1969, the 
Community was in deficit with the United States in excess of $1 billion. 
Exports from the United States amounted to $7 billion and those from the 
Conununity to $5.8 billion. 
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Direct international investment has become a very significant 
alternative to visible exports for producers who expand their outlets 
beyond the national frontiers. 
Since 1958, direct investments by American firms in the Community 
increased nearly fivefold. The capital for these investments comes 
very often from issues floated in Europe and the return on these in-
vestments has become not insignificant in regard to the balance-of-
payments. 
Thus the Community has been, from an overall point of view, bene-
ficial not only to ourselves but also to our trading partners. We in 
Europe have achieved a marked improvement in our standard of living. 
But the internal demand resulting from this improved situation has 
been available also to our external competitors. 
The Community is indeed bound to pursue outward-looking trade 
policies because of its structural dependence on world trade in the 
formation of its national product. Trade accounts for nearly 20 per-
cent of its gross national product, while in the United States the 
corresponding figure is only 7 percent. 
3). Let me outline very briefly our current ideas and plans for 
the further development of the Community. 
A customs union is not sufficient to secure a free circulation of 
all goods and services. Total freedom can be achieved only through the 
elimination of a number of non-tariff barriers. The removal of these 
barriers can be accomplished only through a complex process of harmoni-
zation of national rules and regulations. A great deal remains to be 
done in this respect. 
May I stress that we are aware that non-tariff barriers,whether ad-
ministrative rules and regulations, fees, health and safety standards, 
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technical norms, or public procurement procedures, also affect trade 
with our external partners. The Community cooperates actively in the 
CATT to this end. Whenever possible, those solutions to our own in-
ternal non-tariff barrier problems are sought which are likely to be 
compatible with wider international frameworks. The elimination of 
these barriers at a world level will require considerable effort and 
good will. In the meantime, our own internal efforts of harmonization 
will also be beneficial to our external partners because they will be 
able to deal with a single set of rules and regulations, whereas at 
present there are six. 
4). A common market, as outlined by the Rome treaties, is not only 
a market within which goods should circulate in total freedom; it is 
also an area in which productive factors can be organized by managers 
with a view to achieve greater efficiency, irrespective of the poli-
tical boundaries separating the member states. Labor and capital should 
be allowed to circulate freely, and corporations should enjoy the right 
of establishment in any part of the Community area. 
Once again this implies the harmonization of different national 
legislations. 
5). Finally, the Community must consist not only of a common market 
but also of a set of common economic policies. The founders of the Commu-
nity foresaw that, lacking the required degree of harmonization of national 
economic policies, there could be no guarantee of economic stability in the 
Common Market. Here again it is recognized that, with the exception of the 
agricultural policy, progress has been so far limited. 
6). The Community is, therefore, a reality, but it is still in the 
process of completion. This lack of fulfilment does not, however, justify 
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pessimism over the chances of our ultimate success. We face real and 
objective difficulties; we are fully aware of these, and we are deter-
mined to overcome them. 
The elimination of non-tariff barriers, the establishment of a 
conmon legal, fiscal and financial framework and the harmonization of 
the national economic policies cannot be carried out by the application 
of automatic rules, such as those which have brought about the estab-
lishment of the customs union. 
Every step in this direction results from a specific agreement 
among the governments of the Member Countries in the Council of Ministers. 
It is up to the Conmission to submit proposals which are objective and 
realistic and which reflect the conmon interest: but it is up to the 
Council to take decisions on them. 
Government representatives in the Council reflect the attitude of 
their respective countries concerning any issue under discussion. It 
is not surprising that these attitudes very often differ. The notion 
of conman interest is a subjective one and likely to be influenced by 
local considerations and preoccupations. This Subcommittee no doubt 
appreciates the problems of reconciling the general and the local inter-
est and the short and longer term interest. 
It is the duty of the Commission to fight for decisions which are 
as consistent as possible with the conman interest. Sometimes, imper-
fect compromises are better than none at all for they can be the step-
ping stones for further and better decisions. 
This is the way in which I look at the common agricultural policy, 
an area of Community activity which is subject to serious criticism in 
this country and elsewhere. Special treatment for agricultural pro-
ducts in the customs union was an essential condition for the establishment 
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of the Community. It was dictated by political, economic and social 
considerations. 
The achievement of a common market for agricultural products meant 
the harmonization of six different national policies., in support of agri-
cultural prices. The results can be readily criticized: but this stage 
had to be reached in order to embark upon the next one -- the launching 
of the program known as the Mansholt plan, having as its objective a 
new common European agricultural policy less costly for the taxpayer, 
more evenly rewarding for the producer, and more acceptable to our trad-
ing partners in the world. 
Far-reaching endeavours are inevitably subject to periods of stag-
nation and crisis. What matters, however, is that the sense of progress 
should not be lost. In our case it was not. 
The Community has survived a series of crises, the last of which was 
concluded by the summit meeting held in The Hague last December. It was 
agreed in this meeting to hasten the process of internal consolidation of 
the Community, to set forth as a new objective the establishment of an 
economic and monetary union, and to open negotations with Great Britain 
and other applicant countries. 
7). As a result the Community is now in a new phase of intensive 
activity along four main directions: 
a) discussion of the Mansholt plan for a reform of the common 
agricultural policy; 
b) discussion of the memorandum on a common industrial policy; 
c) discussion of a program of action to achieve economic and 
monetary union before the end of the present decade; 
d) negotations with the applicant countries. 
These four groups are closely interrelated. 
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In order to correct the imbalances and deficiencies of the present 
common agricultural policy, new industrial jobs must be created. This 
requires the promotion of a sustained industrial development in the 
Community. The development must be so conceived as to permit the pro-
ductive structure of the Community to face international competition in 
its various forms. 
Since the industrial structure of the member states differs in terms 
of relative strength, the absence of a harmonious industrial development 
within the Conununity would hinder the achievement of an economic and mone-
tary union, and indeed,would jeopardize the very existence of the customs 
union. 
As concerns the enlargement of the Community, it would seem that 
the desire of the applicants, in particular Great Britain, to join is 
proportional to prospects of greater vitality and internal consolidation 
of the Community. 
The problems which the present common agricultural policy creates 
for Great Britain are well known: hence the importance of the Mansholt 
plan. The advantages entailed in the participation of Britain in the 
customs union offers are limited for British industry. However, British 
industry attaches great importance to a coherent industrial development 
strategy from which it could benefit widely. 
8). The industrial policy which the Commission suggests consists 
of a gradual approach that should promote European industrial and tech-
nological development with a view to a continuation of the present ex-
pansion of international trade and investment. 
The Conunission regards as a first and urgent step in this direction 
the achievement of the common market as a common outlet for all goods and 
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and services. This implies inter alia the liberalization of public pro-
curement policy throughout the Community. Public procurement of goods 
produced in other member countries is at present negligible. 
Government procurement is bound to increase rapidly as a result of 
the explosion of social demand. It is therefore important that the de 
facto preference granted by national authorities to their own industries 
should come to an end. The Commission has the authority and the duty to 
enforce the rules of the Treaties against discrimination practices. But 
national public procurement procedures, particularly for certain sophi-
sticated products, .are such that the enforcement of the common rules is 
not always easy or even possible. 
It is urgent to make a start with the products of certain techno-
logically advanced sectors for which the procurement procedures allow the 
greatest degree of discretion to the public purchaser. Most of our nation 
states are anxious, for a variety of reasons, to promote within their boun-
daries industrial activities in the advanced, technology-intensive sectors. 
The main motivation for this attitude is the fear that otherwise their in-
dustry would be cut off from the rewards which the industrial exploitation 
of technological progress holds in store for those who are capable of ex-
ploiting it and are trained to do so. 
In my opinion this is a legitimate preoccupation. However, the indi-
vidual states of the Community do not have the size required for the emer-
gence of productive structures capable to engage with ultimate success in 
lines of production requiring a large financial and managerial potential 
and for securing an internal outlet of the appropriate dimensions. 
Governments tend to explain their restrictive attitude in regard to 
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the admission to tenders of extra-national competitors by insisting on the 
need of securing at least a partial return for their investment: this in-
vestment is in the form of support given for R&D activities. 
Thus the Commission suggests that theiroblem of liberalizing public 
procurement in these advanced sectors should be attacked at two levels: 
at the time when the support is provided and when the goods become avail-
able. 
9). First of all, the Commission suggests that R&D activities in 
certain technologically-advanced sectors should be financed by the Commu-
nity. This would limit from the outset the inclination of the national 
authorities to reserve their market to their own industry. Community sup-
port, granted on the basis of joint selective decisions, could also be 
used as an incentive for encouraging industrial firms of different member 
states to form joint ventures of long duration. This would be a very good 
way to exploit the availability of the Community as an area of continen-
tal dimensions. 
The Commission suggests further that the cognizant national authori-
ties agree to compare and dovetail their medium-term purchasing programs 
for certain items, with a view of transferring larger and larger portions 
of the consolidated program of procurement from the present restrictive 
practices to non-discriminatory procedures. 
The response of the European firms to these proposals is still to be 
assessed. The choice between the short-term advantages of protectionism 
and the long-term advantages of free competition is always a difficult one. 
Insofar as the authorities are concerned, their response appears to 
be generally positive but cautious; some time will be needed before reach-
ing any conclusion. 
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10). The question that arises in regard to subsidiaries of the non-
European corporations active in the Community seems to be the following: 
'How will they react to these suggestions; how will they use the influence 
which they can bring to bear on national authorities?' I feel that they 
have a great chance in respect to these and similar issues through the 
consolidation of the Community rather than in the present fragmented state 
of the market. 
10) 
At present, the subsidiaries of non-European corporations are in a 
position to share, together with the national industrial activities (when 
these exist), the advantages of national preference in public procurement, 
at the same time being part of powerful multinational organizations capable 
of developing worldwide strategies for the production and marketing of their 
technology. 
This notwithstanding, I hope that these organizations do not oppose 
the suggested course. An accepting attitude of their part would be con-
vincing evidence that multinational corporations are willing and capable 
to reconcile their efforts for maximizing their opportunities with the 
loyalty they owe to the policies of the host countries. In our case the 
host countries are the members of a Community. 
Another problem causing great concern to the Commission is the 
multiplication of state subsidies. These are granted to industrial 
sectors threatened by market modifications or by new technological pro-
cesses, and to plants operating in areas facing difficulties, either be-
cause of underdeveloped or obsolescent industrial structures, or because 
their natural economic cohesion is cut across by political frontiers. 
In many instances, the powers of the Commission to resist this trend 
and to enforce a common discipline are limited. The risks entailed are 
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obvious: competition between national markets where industry is treated 
differently by the authorities could become intolerable; much needed re-
sources are wasted in support of less rewarding activities, and the tran-
sition to more remunerative ones is discouraged. 
The Commission feels that this trend will be gradually reversed; in-
dustrial reconversion and regional problems should be considered as af-
fecting the Community as a whole and solved accordingly. 
It would be very desirable if subsidiaries of multinational cor-
porations maintained policies favoring a consolidation of the Community 
and against national self-interest, even though this posture could re-
duce bilateral bargaining power with the national and local authorities. 
11). The Commission suggests also the establishment of a common 
policy for industrial structures. Industrial structures in highly in-
dustrialized societies tend to oligopolistic situations, as the relevant 
market goes beyond the national boundaries. Industry in the six countries 
of the Common Market could not but follow this trend, and the creation of 
a customs union acts as a powerful incentive in this direction. 
11) 
However, in the past concentration in the Community has, as a general 
rule, either been restricted to firms of the same nationality or to mer-
gers with firms having the decisional center outside the Community. Con-
centration between firms belonging to different member countries has been 
the exception rather than the rule. This trend is inconsistent with the 
objective of developing a competitive industrial structure in the Community. 
Concentration restricted to a national area cannot lead to the optimum 
conditions required in certain advanced sectors. Concentration through mer-
gers with multinational corporations based outside the Community often tends 
to increase the competition to which the Community is exposed, without directly 
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reinforcing her competitive strength through the improvement of her 
structural conditions. 
But this is not all: the emergence of national industrial empires 
controlling the largest share of the national production in any given 
field could inevitably work against the ultimate objective of the Com-
munity which is the fusion of its naticnal components into a single po-
litical entity. The current trend would increase the danger that compe-
tition between firms irrespective of their nationality which is the basic 
principle on which the Comrnunity is based degenerates into competition, 
rivalry and potential hostility between member states. 
This is the reason why the Commission stresses the urgency of joint 
decisions to establish a comrnon legal, fiscal, and financial framework 
conceived for a common market of continental dimensions. 
There is no lack of ideas in this respect. The Commission seeks 
the political will required to translate these ideas into concrete action. 
Such a comrnon framework is indeed an essential condition for making trans-
national cooperations and mergers within the framework of the Community 
available also to the medium-sized industries, which most of all feel the 
need of achieving more competitive structures. 
The Commission has been promoting, for years, the creation within the 
Community of a new "Statute of the Europe an Commercial Corporation, 11 which 
would enable companies engaged in industrial, commercial and banking acti-
vities in the six countries to be subject to identical corporation laws 
and also to onesingle jurisdiction. 
The Commission recognizes, however, that the absence of a comrnon 
body of laws, although an important factor, is not the only explanation 
for the present situation and trend. National authorities are vested 
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with the power of deciding, on behalf of the overall national interest, 
whether or not a merger can take place and the conditions thereof. The 
Commission suggests that these discretionary powers should be gradually 
transferred from the national level to that of the Community. 
Government are invited to start with periodical discussions on the 
criteria whereby they exercise these powers. The matter is not whether 
national authorities should have more or less discretionary powers than 
those which they now have in order to influence the way whereby industry 
can achieve more competitive structures. This is an option which is bound 
to remain open: policies in this respect shall be more or less liberal 
according to the prevailing trends in responsible public opinion. 
The Commission has suggested various means to encourage transnational 
mergers within the Community, such as loans granted by the European In-
vestment Bank to corporations in several different member countries --
since this type of merger is more complicated and expensive than that 
between corporations of the same country. These loans could be supple-
mented as required by guarantees financed from the budget of the Community: 
the Bank might even be authorized to acquire, for a limited period of time, 
stock of the merging corporations. 
The Commission does not advocate the transfer of nationalism and 
protectionism to the Community level, since it is firmly against nation-
alism and protectionism of any kind. The task of the Commission is to 
persuade the member states to achieve fully Community goals according to 
the initial design and without reservations. 
13). The Commission appreciates the invaluable contribution of non-
European corporations, in particular U.S. corporations;with their invest-
ments in the Community these have, in fact, favored an expansion of our 
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economies, an increase in our employment level, the adjustment of our 
regional imbalances, and finally, the enhancement of our capacity for 
a rational utilization of innovation and technological progress and our 
disposition to acquire modern managerial techniques. 
But precisely because the benefits entailed in international invest-
ments, in particular American investment, are so attractive, the Commission 
is concerned lest they become the origin of disruptive forces within the 
Community. 
Thus the Commission advocates that the Community and not national 
and local authorities be vested with whatever responsibility is entailed 
in the control of these investments. 
14). I am aware that the approach reconnnended by the Commission in 
the memorandum on industrial policy raises practical questions as to the 
treatment of the subsidiaries of corporations based outside the Community. 
I have mentioned a few of the points where there appears to be a 
connection between our proposed connnon industrial policy and international 
investments; there are others, of course, for instance in the field of 
finance. 
It seems to me that these matters are so important in the overall 
context of the relations between the United States and Europe, and for 
the further development of the European Community, that they could very 
well be a particular subject of discussion between the two parties within 
an appropriate framework. 
I would like to say at this point, as a former member of the European 
Commission, how much I appreciate the activities of this Subconnnittee and 
how timely they are. But a few days ago an American newspaper published 
and widely read in Europe carried a headline stating that the United States 
14) 
and the European Community are on the brink of a trade war. 
This is not pleasant reading for anyone convinced as I am that there 
is a fundamental and indivisible identity of long-term interests between 
the United States and Europe, One cannot but feel that the conflicts which 
are at the origin of the present situation are of limited relevance when 
related to the global relationship across the Atlantic. I do not mean to 
say that these conflicts should be disregarded because they refer to li-
mited economic sectors in the United States and Europe, representing only 
a marginal factor in the creation of wealth in our respective countries, 
In fact, the isolated consideration of sectorial issues may reach 
such a level of intensity as to create new and far more serious problems. 
In a climate of sophisticated interdependence, one in which highly in-
dustrialized societies must secure their evolution, all issues hang to-
gether: and this goes also for international investments. 
15), I would propose that we Europeans should persuade our American 
friends to help redress an unbalanced situation by placing these problems 
in a global context. 
Our industries are far more apparent on foreign markets with their 
visible exports than with their subsidiaries. As a result, Europe is more 
vulnerable to any restrictive measure of international trade which may be 
taken by our trading partners. This also means that we cannot, in any 
comparable degree, surmount tariff and non-tariff obstacles, take full ad-
vantage of public procurement, adjust our production to the specific cir-
cumstances of any given market, We cannot, in other words, benefit from 
the same advantages enjoyed by our American competitors. 
Furthermore, earnings from international investments are a welcome 
contribution to the positive side of the balance-of-payments. 
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We are no doubt responsible for this shortcoming: we must try to 
correct it, making full use of our Conununity and without indulging in 
sterile protectionist practices. The final outcome would render us more 
competitive also at the level of international investment, thus allowing 
us to cooperate for a continuation of free-trade economic policies through-
out the world. 
We could certainly use a discussion of this kind also to exchange 
information and consult with each other on the problems of antitrust 
policies connected with international investment. In fact, the problem 
of political control of corporations which, because of their worldwide 
operation, do not fit precisely in any national legislative framework, 
and tend to appear -- even without justification -- at odds with national 
or regional economic development programs, cannot be but settled through 
negotiations between the two most industrialized areas on the world. 
16). The outcome of these talks could be an improvement of what 
appears to be the most efficient instrument of development in an advanced 
industrial society. 
Multinational enterprises were born to utilize with ever increasing 
efficiency resources such as raw materials, capital, management, and re-
search. But how many of these corporations can rightly be called "multi-
national," and how many are instead merely large enterprises which limit 
themselves to operating on various markets? 
An enterprise is truly multinational when not only its body of stock-
holders is at the international level, but -- all the more important --
when the investment and the market strategies are set forth by decision-
making organs of a multinational nature. 
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Only an internationalization of these top-level organs can guarantee 
a fulfilmknt of the responsibilities assumed by the multinational corpo-
rations toward the countries in which they chose to operate. 
# # # # # 
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